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ON THE CONVERGENCE PROBLEM IN MEAN FIELD GAMES: A
TWO STATE MODEL WITHOUT UNIQUENESS
ALEKOS CECCHIN, PAOLO DAI PRA, MARKUS FISCHER, AND GUGLIELMO PELINO
Abstract. We consider N-player and mean field games in continuous time over a finite
horizon, where the position of each agent belongs to {−1, 1}. If there is uniqueness
of mean field game solutions, e.g. under monotonicity assumptions, then the master
equation possesses a smooth solution which can be used to prove convergence of the
value functions and of the feedback Nash equilibria of the N-player game, as well as a
propagation of chaos property for the associated optimal trajectories. We study here an
example with anti-monotonous costs, and show that the mean field game has exactly
three solutions. We prove that the value functions converge to the entropy solution of
the master equation, which in this case can be written as a scalar conservation law in
one space dimension, and that the optimal trajectories admit a limit: they select one
mean field game soution, so there is propagation of chaos. Moreover, viewing the mean
field game system as the necessary conditions for optimality of a deterministic control
problem, we show that the N-player game selects the optimizer of this problem.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we study a simple yet illustrative example concerning the convergence
problem in finite horizon mean field games. Mean field games, as introduced by J.-
M. Lasry and P.-L. Lions and, independently, by M. Huang, R.P. Malhamé and P.E. Caines
(cf. [25, 22]), are limit models for symmetric non-cooperative many player dynamic games
as the number of players tends to infinity; see, for instance, the lecture notes [5] and the
recent two-volume work [8]. The notion of optimality adopted for the many player games
is usually that of a Nash equilibrium. The limit relation can then be made rigorous in two
opposite directions: either by showing that a solution of the limit model (the mean field
game) induces a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player games with
approximation error tending to zero as N →∞, or by identifying the possible limit points
of sequences of N -player Nash equilibria, again in the limit as N → ∞, as solutions, in
some sense, of the limit model. This latter direction constitutes the convergence problem
in mean field games.
Important for the convergence problem is the choice of admissible strategies and the
resulting definition of Nash equilibrium in the many player games. For Nash equilibria
defined in stochastic open-loop strategies, the convergence problem is rather well un-
derstood, see [18] and, especially, [23], both in the context of finite horizon games with
general Brownian dynamics. In [23], limit points of sequences of N -player Nash equilibria
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are shown to be concentrated on weak solutions of the corresponding mean field game.
This concept of solution is also used in another, more recent work by Lacker; see below.
Here, we are interested in the convergence problem for Nash equilibria in Markov feed-
back strategies with full state information. A first result in this direction was given by
Gomes, Mohr, and Souza [19] in the case of finite state dynamics. There, convergence of
Markovian Nash equilibria to the mean field game limit is proved, but only if the time
horizon is small enough. A breakthrough was achieved by Cardaliaguet, Delarue, Lasry,
and Lions in [7]. In the setting of games with non-degenerate Brownian dynamics, possi-
bly including common noise, those authors establish convergence to the mean field game
limit, in the sense of convergence of value functions as well as propagation of chaos for
the optimal state trajectories, for arbitrary time horizon provided the so-called master
equation associated with the mean field game possesses a unique sufficiently regular so-
lution. The master equation arises as the formal limit of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
systems determining the Markov feedback Nash equilibria. It yields, if well-posed, the
optimal value in the mean field game as a function of initial time, state and distribution.
It thus also provides the optimal control action, again as a function of time, state, and
measure variable. This allows, in particular, to compare the prelimit Nash equilibria to
the solution of the limit model through coupling arguments.
If the master equation possesses a unique regular solution, which is guaranteed under
the Lasry-Lions monotonicity conditions, then the convergence analysis can be consider-
ably refined. In this case, for games with finite state dynamics, Cecchin and Pelino [11]
and, independently, Bayraktar and Cohen [3] obtain a central limit theorem and large
deviations principle for the empirical measures associated with Markovian Nash equilib-
ria. In [14, 15], Delarue, Lacker, and Ramanan carry out the analysis, enriched by a
concentration of measure result, for Brownian dynamics without or with common noise.
Well-posedness of the master equation implies uniqueness of solutions to the mean
field game, given any initial time and initial distribution. Here, we study the convergence
problem in Markov feedback strategies for a simple example exhibiting non-uniqueness of
solutions. The model has dynamics in continuous time with players’ states taking values
in {−1, 1}. Running costs only depend on the control actions, while terminal costs are
anti-monotonic with respect to the state and measure variable. Such an example was first
considered by Gomes, Velho, and Wolfram in [20, 21], where numerical evidence on the
convergence behavior was presented; it should also be compared to Lacker’s “illuminating
example” (Subsection 3.3 in [23]) and to the example in Subsection 3.3 of [1] by Bardi
and Fischer, both in the diffusion setting. In the infinite time horizon and finite state
case, an example of non-uniqueness is studied in [13], via numerical simulations, where
periodic orbits emerge as solutions to the mean field game.
For the two-state example studied here, the mean field game possesses exactly three
solutions, given any initial distribution, as soon as the time horizon is large enough.
Consequently, there is no regular solution to the master equation, while multiple weak
solutions exist. For the N -player game, on the other hand, there is a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium in Markov feedback strategies for each N , determined by the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman system. We show that the value functions associated with these Nash
equilibria converge, as N → ∞, to a particular solution of the master equation. In our
case, the master equation can be written as a scalar conservation law in one variable (cf.
Subsection 3.2). The (weak) solution that is selected by the N -player Nash equilibria can
then be characterized as the unique entropy solution of the conservation law. The entropy
solution presents a discontinuity in the measure variable (at the distribution that assigns
equal mass to both states). Convergence of the value functions is uniform outside any
neighborhood of the discontinuity. We also prove propagation of chaos for the N -player
state processes provided that their averaged initial distributions do not converge to the
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discontinuity. The proofs of convergence adapt arguments from [11] based on the fact
that the entropy solution is smooth away from its discontinuity, as well as a qualitative
property of the N -player Nash equilibria, which prevents crossing of the discontinuity.
The entropy solution property is actually not used in the proof. In Subsection 3.6, we
give an alternative characterization of the solution selected by the Nash equilibria in
terms of a variational problem based on the potential game structure of our example.
Potential mean field games have been studied in several works in the continuous state
setting, starting from [6] by Cardaliaguet, Graber, Porretta and Tonon.
Let us mention three recent preprints that are related to our paper. In [26], Nutz, San
Martin, and Tan address the convergence problem for a class of mean field games of opti-
mal stopping. The limit model there possesses multiple solutions, which are grouped into
three classes according to a qualitative criterion characterizing the proportion of players
that have stopped at any given time. Solutions in one of the three classes will always arise
as limit points of N -player Nash equilibria, solutions in the second class may be selected
in the limit, while solutions in the third class cannot be reached through N -player Nash
equilibria. In [24], Lacker attacks the convergence problem in Markov feedback strategies
by probabilistic methods. For a class of games with non-degenerate Brownian dynamics
that may exhibit non-uniqueness, the author shows that all limit points of the N -player
feedback Nash equilibria are concentrated, as in the open-loop case, on weak solutions of
the mean field game. These solutions are more general than randomizations of ordinary
(“strong”) solutions of the mean field game; their flows of measures, in particular, are
allowed to be stochastic containing additional randomness. Still, uniqueness in ordinary
solutions implies uniqueness in weak solutions, which permits to partially recover the re-
sults in [7]. The question of which weak solutions can appear as limits of feedback Nash
equilibria in a situation of non-uniqueness seems to be mainly open. In [16], Delarue
and Foguen Tchuendom study a class of linear-quadratic mean field games with multiple
solutions in the diffusion setting. They prove that by adding a common noise to the limit
dynamics uniqueness of solutions is re-established. As a converse to this regularization
by noise result, they identify the mean field game solutions that are selected when the
common noise tends to zero as those induced by the (unique weak) entropy solution of
the master equation of the original problem. The interpretation of the master equation
as a scalar conservation law works in their case thanks to a one-dimensional parametriza-
tion of an a priori infinite dimensional problem. Limit points of N -player Nash equlibria
are also considered in [16], but in stochastic open-loop strategies. Again, the mean field
game solutions that are selected are those induced by the entropy solution of the mas-
ter equation. Interestingly, these solutions are not minimal cost solutions; indeed, the
solution which minimizes the cost of the representative player in the mean field game is
shown to be different from the ones selected by the limit of the Nash equilibria. In [16],
the N -player limit and the vanishing common noise limit both select two solutions of the
original mean field game with equal probability. This is due to the fact that in [16] the
initial distribution for the state trajectories is chosen to sit at the discontinuity of the
unique entropy solution of the master equation. In our case, we expect to see the same
behavior if we started at the discontinuity, see Section 4 below.
It is worth mentioning that the opposite situation, with respect to the one treated here,
is considered in the examples presented in [17] and in Section 7.2.5 of [8], Volume I. In
these examples, uniqueness of mean field game solutions holds, but there are multiple
feedback Nash equilibria for the N -player game. This is due to the fact that in both cases
the authors consider a finite action set (while for us it is continuous), so that in particular
the Nash system is not well-posed. They prove that there is a sequence of (feedback)
Nash equilibria which converges to the mean field game limit, but also a sequence that
does not converge.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, for a class of mean field
and N -player games with finite state space, we give the definition of N -player Nash equi-
librium and solution of the mean field game, and introduce the corresponding differential
equations, namely the N -player Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, the mean field game
system as well as the associated master equation. Section 3 presents the two-state exam-
ple, starting from the limit model, analyzed first in terms of the mean field game system
(Subsection 3.1), then in terms of its master equation (Subsection 3.2). In Subsections
3.4 and 3.5 we show that the N -player Nash equilibria converge to the unique entropy
solution of the master equation; cf. Theorems 8 and 11 below for convergence of value
functions and propagation of chaos, respectively. The qualitative property of the Nash
equilibria used in the proofs of convergence is in Subsection 3.3. Subsection 3.6 gives
the variational characterization of the solution that is selected by the Nash equilibria.
Concluding remarks are in Section 4.
2. Mean field games with finite state space
2.1. The N-player game. We consider the continuous time evolution of the states Xi(t),
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , of N players; the state of each player belongs to a given finite set Σ.
Players are allowed to control, via an arbitrary feedback, their jump rates. For i =
1, 2, . . . , N and y ∈ Σ, we denote by αiy : [0, T ] × ΣN → [0,+∞) the rate at which player
i jumps to the state y ∈ Σ: it is allowed to depend on the time t ∈ [0, T ], and on the
state x = (xi)
N
i=1 of all players. Denoting by A the set of functions [0, T ]×ΣN → [0,+∞)
which are measurable and locally integrable in time, we assume αiy ∈ A. So we write
αi ∈ A := AΣ, and let αN ∈ AN denote the controls of all players, and will be also called
strategy vector. In more rigorous terms, for αN ∈ AN , the state evolutionXt := (Xi(t))Ni=1
is a Markov process, whose law is uniquely determined as solution to the martingale
problem for the time-dependent generator
Ltf(x) =
N∑
i=1
∑
y∈Σ
αiy(t,x)
[
f([xi, y])− f(x)
]
,
where
[xi, y]j =
{
xj for j 6= i
y for j = i.
Now let
P (Σ) := {m ∈ [0, 1]Σ :
∑
x∈Σ
mx = 1}
be the simplex of probability measures on Σ. To every x ∈ ΣN we associate the element
of P (Σ)
(1) mN,ix :=
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
δxj .
Thus, mN,iX (t) := m
N,i
Xt
is the empirical measure of all the players except the i-th. Given
the functions
L : Σ× [0,+∞)Σ → R, F : Σ× P (Σ)→ R, G : Σ× P (Σ)→ R,
the feedback controls αN ∈ AN and the corresponding process X(·), the cost associated
to the i-th player is given by
JNi (α
N ) := E
[∫ T
0
[
L(Xi(t), α
i(t,Xt)) + F
(
Xi(t),m
N,i
X (t)
)]
dt +G
(
Xi(T ),m
N,i
X (T )
)]
.
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For a strategy vector αN = (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ AN and β ∈ A, denote by [αN,−i;β] the
perturbed strategy vector given by
[αN,−i;β]j :=
{
αj, j 6= i
β, j = i.
Definition 1. A strategy vector αN is a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if for
each i = 1, . . . , N
JNi (α
N ) = inf
β∈A
JNi ([α
N,−i;β]).
The search for a Nash equilibrium is based on the Hamilton-Jacobi equations that we
now briefly illustrate. Define the Hamiltonian H : Σ×RΣ → R as the Legendre transform
of L:
(2) H(x, p) := sup
a∈[0,+∞)Σ
{−(a · p)x − L(x, a)} ,
with (a · p)x :=
∑
y 6=x
aypy. We will assume the supremum in (2) is attained at an unique
maximizer a∗(x, p).
Given a function g : Σ→ R, we denote its first finite difference ∆g(x) ∈ RΣ by
∆g(x) := (g(y) − g(x))y∈Σ .
When we have a function g : ΣN → R, we denote with ∆jg(x) ∈ RΣ the first finite
difference with respect to the j-th coordinate. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system
associated to the above differential game is given by:
(3)−
∂v
∂t
N,i
(t,x)−∑Nj=1, j 6=i a∗(xj ,∆jvN,j) ·∆jvN,i +H(xi,∆ivN,i) = F (xi,mN,ix ) ,
vN,i(T,x) = G
(
xi,m
N,i
x
)
.
This is a system of N |Σ|N coupled ODE’s, indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and x ∈ ΣN ,
whose well-posedness for all T > 0 can be proved through standard ODEs techniques
under regularity assumptions which guarantee that a∗ and H are uniformly Lipschitz in
their second variable. Under these conditions, the N -player game has a unique Nash
equilibrium given by the feedback strategy αN ∈ AN defined by
αi,N (t,x) := a∗(xi,∆
ivN,i(t,x)) i = 1, . . . , N.
2.2. The macroscopic limit: the mean field game and the master equation.
The limit as N → +∞ of the N -player game admits two alternative descriptions, that
we illustrate here at heuristic level. Assuming the empirical measure of the process
corresponding to the Nash equilibrium obeys a Law of Large Numbers, i.e. it converges
to a deterministic flow in P (Σ), a representative player in the limit as N → +∞ faces the
following problem:
(i) the player controls its jump intensities αy : [0, T ] × Σ → [0,+∞), y ∈ Σ, via
feedback controls depending on time and on his/her own state;
(ii) For a given deterministic flow of probability measures m : [0, T ] → P (Σ), the
player aims at minimizing the cost
(4) J(α,m) := E
[∫ T
0
[L(X(t), α(t,X(t))) + F (X(t),m(t))] dt+G(X(T ),m(T ))
]
.
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(iii) Denote by α∗,m the optimal control for the above problem, and let (X∗,m(t))t∈[0,T ]
be the corresponding optimal process. The above-mentioned Law of Large Num-
ber predicts that the flow (m(t))t∈[0,T ] should be chosen so that the following
consistency relation holds:
m(t) = Law(X∗,m(t))
foe every t ∈ [0, T ].
This is implemented by coupling the HJB equation for the control problem with cost (4)
with the forward Kolmogorov equation for the evolution of the Law(X∗,m(t)), obtaining
the so-called Mean Field Game System:
(MFG)

− d
dt
u(t, x) +H(x,∆xu(t, x)) = F (x,m(t)),
d
dt
mx(t) =
∑
ymy(t)a
∗
x(y,∆
yu(t, y)),
u(T, x) = G(x,m(T )),
mx(0) = mx,0,
It is known, and largely exemplified in this paper, that well-posedness of (3) does not
imply uniqueness of solution to (MFG).
An alternative description of the macroscopic limit stems from the ansatz that the
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system (3) is of the form
vN,i(t,x) = UN (t, xi,m
N,i
x ),
for some UN : [0, T ] × Σ × P (Σ) → R. Assuming UN admits a limit U as N → +∞,
we formally obtain that U solves the following equation, that will be referred to as the
master equation:
(MAS){
−∂U
∂t
(t, x,m)+H(x,∆xU(t, x,m))−∫ΣDmU(t, x,m, y)·a∗(y,∆yU(t, y,m))dm(y)=F (x,m)
U(T, x,m) = G(x,m), (x,m) ∈ Σ× P (Σ),
where the derivative DmU : [0, T ] × Σ × P (Σ) × Σ → RΣ with respect to m ∈ P (Σ) is
defined by
(5) [DmU(t, x,m, y)]z := lim
s↓0
U(t, x,m+ s(δz − δy))− U(t, x,m)
s
.
We conclude this section by recalling that uniqueness in both (MFG) and (MAS) is
guaranteed if the cost function F and G are monotone in the Lasry-Lions sense, i.e. for
every m,m′ ∈ P (Σ),
(6)
∑
x∈Σ
(F (x,m)− F (x,m′))(mx −m′x) ≥ 0,
and the same for G. We are interested here in examples that violate this monotonicity
condition.
3. An example of non uniqueness
We consider now a special example within the class of models described above. We let
Σ := {−1, 1} be the state space. An element m ∈ P (Σ) can be identified with its mean
m1 −m−1; so from now we write m ∈ [−1, 1] to denote the mean, while the element of
P (Σ) will be denoted only in vector form (m1,m−1). We also write α
i(t,x) for αi−xi(t,x),
i.e. the rate at which player i flips its state from xi to −xi. Moreover we choose
L(x, a) :=
a2
2
, F (x,m) ≡ 0, G(x,m) := −mx.
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The final cost favors alignment with the majority, while the running cost is a simple
quadratic cost. Compared to condition (6), note that the final cost is anti-monotonic, as∑
x∈Σ
(G(x,m) −G(x,m′))(mx −m′x) = −(m−m′)2 ≤ 0.
The associated Hamiltonian is given by
(7) H(x, p) = sup
a≥0
{
ap−x − a
2
2
}
=
(p−−x)
2
2
,
with a∗(x, p) = p−−x, where p
− denotes the negative part of p. From now on, we identify
p with p−x ∈ R and ∆xu with its non-zero component u(−x)− u(x).
3.1. The mean field game system. The first equation in (MFG), i.e the HJB equation
for the value function u(t, x), reads, using (7),
(8)
{
− d
dt
u(t, x) + 12 [(∆
xu(t, x))−]
2
= 0
u(T, x) = −m(T )x
Now define z(t) := u(t,−1) − u(t, 1). Subtracting the equations (8) for x = ±1 and
observing that [
(∆xu(t,−1))−]2 − [(∆xu(t, 1))−]2 = z|z|,
we have that z(t) solves
(9)
{
z˙ = z|z|2
z(T ) = 2m(T ).
This equation must be coupled with the forward Kolmogorov equation, i.e. the second
equation in (MFG), that reads m˙ = −m|z| + z. The mean field game system takes
therefore the form:
(10)

z˙ = z|z|2
m˙ = −m|z|+ z
z(T ) = 2m(T )
m(0) = m0.
Proposition 2. Let T (m0) be the unique solution in
[
1
2 , 2
]
of the equation
(11) |m0| = (2T − 1)
2(T + 4)
27T
.
Then, for every m0 ∈ [−1, 1] \ {0}, system (10) admits
(i) a unique solution for T < T (m0);
(ii) two distinct solutions for T = T (m0);
(iii) three distinct solutions for T > T (m0).
If m0 = 0, then T (0) = 1/2 and (10) admits
(i) a unique solution for T ≤ 1/2;
(ii) three distinct solutions for T > 1/2: the constant zero solution, (z+,m+), and
(z−,m−), where m+(t) = −m−(t) > 0 for every t ∈ (0, T ].
Proof. Note that (9) can be solved as a final value problem, giving
(12) z(t) =
2m(T )
|m(T )|(T − t) + 1 .
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This can then be inserted in the forward Kolmogorov equation m˙ = −m|z|+ z, giving as
unique solution
(13) m(t) = (m0 − sgn(m(T )))
( |m(T )|(T − t) + 1
|m(T )|T + 1
)2
+ sgn(m(T )).
These are actually solutions of (10) if and only if the consistency relation obtained by
setting t = T in (13) holds, i.e. if and only if m(T ) =M solves
(14) T 2M3 + T (2− T )M |M |+ (1− 2T )M −m0 = 0.
Moreover, distinct solutions of (14) correspond to distinct solutions of (10). We first look
for nonnegative solutions of (14). Set
f(M) := T 2M3 + T (2− T )M2 + (1− 2T )M −m0.
Note that
f ′(M) < 0 ⇐⇒ M ∈
(
− 1
T
,
2T − 1
3T
)
.
If T ≤ 12 then f is strictly increasing in (0,+∞), so the equation f(M) = 0 admits a
unique nonnegative solution if m0 ≥ 0, otherwise there is no nonnegative solution. If
T > 12 , then f restricted to (0,+∞) has a global minimum at M∗ = 2T−13T . If m0 > 0 then
there is still a unique nonnegative solution, while for m0 = 0 there are two nonnegative
solution, one of which is zero. If, instead, m0 < 0, so that f(0) > 0, the equation
f(M) = 0 has zero, one or two nonnegative solutions, depending on whether f(M∗) > 0,
f(M∗) = 0 or f(M∗) < 0 respectively. Observing that
f(M∗) = −m0 − (2T − 1)
2(T + 4)
27T
,
we see that those three alternatives occur if T < T (m0), T = T (m0) and T > T (m0)
respectively. The case M ≤ 0 is treated similarly.

3.2. The Master Equation. Identifying again a probability on Σ with its mean m,
using the expression for H and its minimizer given in (7), the Master Equation (MAS)
takes the form
(15)

−∂U
∂t
(t, x,m) +12
[
(∆xU(t, x,m))−
]2−DmU(t, x,m, 1) (∆xU(t, 1,m))− 1+m2
−DmU(t, x,m,−1) (∆xU(t,−1,m))− 1−m2 = F (x,m),
U(T, x,m) = G(x,m), (x,m) ∈ {−1, 1} × [−1, 1].
In (15), the derivative DmU is still intended in the sense introduced in (5), but identifying
the resulting vector with its non-zero component (e.g. DmU(t, x,m, 1) = [DmU(t, x,m, 1)]−1
= ∂
∂(m
−1−m1)
U(t, x,m)). Similarly, we identify the vector ∆xU with its non-zero compo-
nent. Setting
Z(t,m) := U(T − t,−1,m)− U(T − t, 1,m),
we easily derive a closed equation for Z:
(16)
∂Z∂t + ∂∂m
(
mZ|Z|2 − Z
2
2
)
= 0,
Z(0,m) = 2m,
where ∂
∂m
is denoting the differentiation in the usual sense with respect to m ∈ [−1, 1].
In particular, observe that ∂
∂m
= 12
∂
∂(m
−1−m1)
.
Note that this equation has the form of a scalar conservation law
(17)
{
∂Z
∂t
(t,m) + ∂
∂m
g(m,Z(t,m)) = 0
Z(0,m) = f(m).
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Scalar conservation laws typically possess unique smooth solutions for small time, but de-
velop singularities in finite time: weak solutions exist but uniqueness may fail. To recover
uniqueness the notion of entropy solution is introduced. A simple sufficient condition can
be given for piecewise smooth functions (see [12]).
Proposition 3. Let Z(t,m) be a piecewise C1 function, which is C1 outside a C1 curve
m = γ(t), and assume the following conditions hold:
(i) Z solves (17) in the classical sense outside the curve m = γ(t).
(ii) The initial condition Z(0,m) = f(m) holds for every m;
(iii) Denoting
Z+(t) := lim
m↓γ(t)
Z(t,m), Z−(t) := lim
m↑γ(t)
Z(t,m),
we have that, for every t ≥ 0 and every c strictly between Z−(t) and Z+(t),
(18) γ˙(t) =
g(γ(t), Z−(t))− g(γ(t), Z+(t))
Z−(t)− Z+(t) ,
(19)
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Z+(t))
c− Z+(t) < γ˙(t) <
g(γ(t), c) − g(γ(t), Z−(t))
c− Z−(t) .
Then, Z is the unique entropy solution of (17).
Condition (18) is called the Rankine-Hugoniot condition, while (19) is called the Lax
condition. When specialized to the case g(m, z) := m z|z|2 − z
2
2 and γ(t) ≡ 0 we simply
obtain
(20) Z+(t) = −Z−(t) ≥ 0.
For equation (16), the entropy solution can be explicitly found. Let
(21) g(M, t,m) := t2M3 + t(2− t)M |M |+ (1− 2t)M −m
and M(t,m) denote the unique solution to g(M, t,m) = 0 with the same sign of m, if
m 6= 0; M is defined for any time and let M(t, 0) ≡ 0. Define
(22) Z(t,m) :=
2M(t,m)
t|M(t,m)|+ 1 :
such function has a unique discontinuity inm = 0, for t > 1/2, and is C1 outside. However,
observe that equation (16) must be solved in the finite interval t ∈ [0, T ], where T is the
final time appearing in (15). Thus, for T < 1/2 the solution is regular.
Theorem 4. The function Z defined in (22) is the unique entropy admissible weak solu-
tion to (16).
Proof. From the properties of g(M, t,m), it follows that
lim
m↓0
M(t,m) = − lim
m↑0
M(t,m) ≥ 0,
for any time. These limits correspond to the solutions m+ and m− of Proposition 2, eval-
uated at the terminal time. Therefore (20) is satisfied. We remark that the conservation
law is set in the domain [−1, 1] without any boundary condition, but this is not a problem
as we have invariance of the domain under the action of the characteristics. 
Remark 5. We observe that to the entropy solution (22) of (16) there corresponds a
unique solution of (15). It can be constructed via the method of characteristic curves, in
terms of a specific solution to the mean field game system for the couple (u,m), the one
that corresponds to the solution to (10) employed in the definition of (22).
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It is known that, if there were a regular solution to the master equation (16), thus
Lipschitz in m, then this solution would provide a unique solution to the mean field game
system (10), since the KFP equation would be well posed for any initial condition, when
using z(t) = Z(T − t,m(t)) induced by the solution to the master equation:
(23)
{
m˙ = −m|Z(T − t,m)|+ Z(T − t,m)
m(0) = m0.
In our example there are no regular solutions to the master equation; however the entropy
solution still induces a unique mean field game solution, if m0 6= 0.
Proposition 6. Let Z be the entropy solution defined in (22). Then (23) admits a unique
solution m∗, for any T , if m0 6= 0: it is the unique solution which does not change sign,
for any time.
Proof. Let m0 > 0. If t and |m −m0| are small then Z(T − t,m) is regular (Lipschitz-
continuous) and remains positive. So we have a unique solution to (23), for small time
t ∈ [0, t0]; moreover it is such that m˙ > 0 and hence in particular m(t0) > m0. Thus we
can iterate this procedure starting from m(t0) > 0: we end up with the required solution,
which is positive and such that m(t) > m0 for any time. This solution is unique (for any
T ) since Z(t,m) is Lipschitz for m ∈ [m0, 1]. In fact the other two solutions described in
Proposition 2 would require the vector field Z in (23) to be negative for any time, and
this is not possible when considering the entropy solution Z. The same argument gives
the claim when m0 < 0. 
3.3. Properties of the N+1-player game. We consider now the game played by N+1
players, labeled by the integers {0, 1, . . . , N}. By symmetry, we can interpret the player
with label 0 as the representative player. Let
µNx :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi=1 ∈
{
0,
1
N
,
2
N
, . . . ,
N − 1
N
, 1
}
be the fraction of the “other” players having state 1. Comparing with the notations in
(1), note that µNx =
1+mN+1,0
x
2 . In what follows, we use N rather than N + 1 as apex
in all objects related to the N + 1-player game. By symmetry again, the value function
vN,0(t,x) introduced in (3) is of the form
vN,0(t,x) = V N (t, x0, µ
N
x ),
where V N : [0, T ]×{−1, 1}×
{
0, 1
N
, 2
N
, . . . , N−1
N
, 1
}
→ R. Since the model we are consid-
ering, besides permutation invariance, is invariant by the sign change of the state vector,
it follows that
(24) V N (t, 1, µNx ) = V
N (t,−1, 1 − µNx ).
We can therefore redefine V N (t, µ) := V N (t, 1, µ); from the HJB systems (3) we derive
the following closed equation for V N :
(25)
− d
dt
V N (t, µ)+H(V N(t,1− µ)−V N (t,µ))=Nµ
[
V N(t,1− µ)−V N(t,µ)
]−[
V N
(
t,µ− 1
N
)
−V N(t,µ)
]
+N(1− µ)
[
V N
(
t,µ+ 1
N
)
− V N
(
t,1− µ− 1
N
)]−[
V N
(
t,µ+ 1
N
)
− V N (t,µ)
]
V N (T, µ) = −(2µ− 1),
with H(p) = (p
−)2
2 . It is easy to check that, when imposing a final datum V
N (T, µ) ∈
[−1, 1], any solution to system (25) is such that V N (t, µ) ∈ [−1, 1] for any t < T . The
locally Lipschitz property of the vector field is thus enough to conclude the existence and
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uniqueness of solution for any T > 0 for the above system with |V N (t, µ)| ≤ 1. Such
solution allows to obtain the unique Nash equilibrium, given by the feedback strategy
(26) α0,N (t,x) =

[
V N (t, 1− µNx )− V N (t, µNx )
]−
for x0 = 1[
V N (t, 1− µNx )− V N (t, µNx )
]+
for x0 = −1.
We now set
ZN (t, µ) := V N (t, 1− µ)− V N (t, µ).
The following result, that will be useful later, shows that if the representative player
agrees with the majority, i.e. x0 = 1 and µ
N
x ≥ 12 , or x0 = −1 and µNx ≤ 12 , then she/he
keeps her/his state by applying the control zero.
Theorem 7. For any µ ∈ SN =
{
0, 1
N
, . . . , 1
}
, we have
ZN (t, µ) ≥ 0 (αN (t, 1, µ) = 0) if µ ≥ 1
2
,(27)
ZN (t, µ) ≤ 0 (αN (t,−1, µ) = 0) if µ ≤ 1
2
.(28)
Proof. We prove (27), the proof of (28) is similar. For any N even, observe that ZN (12) =
0, so that it is enough to prove the claim for µ ≥ 12 + 1N . Define
WN (t, µ) := V N (t,µ)− V N (t, µ+ 1
N
).
By (25),
d
dt
ZN (t,µ)=H(−ZN (t, µ))−H(ZN (t, µ))
+Nµ
{(
ZN (t, µ)
)−
WN
(
t,µ− 1
N
)(
ZN
(
t, µ− 1
N
))−
WN (t,1− µ)
}
−N(1− µ)
{(
ZN
(
t, µ+
1
N
))+
WN (t, µ)+
(
ZN (t, µ)
)+
WN
(
t, 1− µ− 1
N
)}
(29)
and
d
dt
WN(t, µ) = H(ZN (t, µ))−H
(
ZN
(
t, µ+
1
N
))
−Nµ
(
ZN (t, µ)
)−
WN
(
t, µ− 1
N
)
+N
(
µ+
1
N
)(
ZN
(
t, µ+
1
N
))−
WN (t, µ)
+N(1− µ)
(
ZN
(
t,µ+
1
N
))+
WN(t, µ)
−N
(
1− µ− 1
N
)(
ZN
(
t,µ+
2
N
))+
WN
(
t, µ+
1
N
)
.
(30)
Note that, for µ > 12 , Z
N (T, µ) = 4µ− 2 > 0 and WN (T, µ) = 2
N
> 0. So, set
s := sup
{
t ≤ T : ZN (t, ν) ≤ 0 or WN (t, ν) ≤ 0 for some ν > 1
2
}
.
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We complete the proof by showing that s = −∞. Assume s > −∞. For t ∈ [s, T ] we have
ZN (t, µ) ≥ 0 and WN (t, µ) ≥ 0 for all µ > 12 , so, from (29), observing that the terms in(
ZN
)−
disappear,
d
dt
ZN (t, µ) ≤ H(−ZN(t, µ)) +N(1− µ)ZN (t, µ)WN
(
t, 1− µ− 1
N
)
= ZN(t, µ)
[
1
2
ZN (t, µ) +N(1− µ)WN
(
t, 1− µ− 1
N
)]
.
Since the control zero is suboptimal, it follows that |V N (t, µ)| ≤ 1 for all t, µ, so that
|ZN (t, µ)| ≤ 2 and |WN (t, µ)| ≤ 2. Therefore, for t ∈ [s, T ], ZN (t, µ) is bounded from
below by the solution of
d
dt
z(t) = z(t) [1 + 2N(1− µ)]
z(T ) = 4µ− 2
(31)
which is strictly positive for all times. In particular ZN (s, µ) > 0. Similarly, for t ∈ [s, T ],
from (30)
d
dt
WN (t, µ) ≤ N(1− µ)ZN
(
t, µ+
1
N
)
WN(t, µ) ≤ 2N(1 − µ)WN (t, µ),
which implies that alsoWN (s, µ) > 0; by continuity in time, this contradicts the definition
of s. Finally, observe that in the proof we fixed N even. The proof for N odd can be
easily adapted with a bit of care, noting that µ = 12 cannot hold. 
3.4. Convergence of the value functions. We now consider the value function V N ,
the unique solution to equation (25), and study its limit as N → +∞. We show that its
limit corresponds to the entropy solution of the Master Equation (15). More precisely,
let U be the solution to (15) corresponding to the entropy solution Z of (16). Define, for
µ ∈ [0, 1]
U∗(t, µ) := U (t, 1, 2µ − 1) .
Note that, for T > 12 , U
∗(t, ·) is discontinuous at µ = 12 , but it is smooth elsewhere. Next
result establishes that V N converges to U∗ uniformly outside any neighborhood of µ = 12 .
In what follows, SN :=
{
0, 1
N
, 2
N
, . . . , 1
}
.
Theorem 8 (Convergence of value functions). For any ε > 0, t ∈ [0, T ] and µ ∈ SN \(
1
2 − ε, 12 + ε
)
we have
(32) |V N (t, µ)− U∗(t, µ)| ≤ Cε
N
,
where Cε does not depend on N nor on t, µ, but limε→0Cε = +∞.
The proof of Theorem 8 is based on the arguments developed in [11]. We first slightly
extend the above notation, letting, for x ∈ {−1, 1}
U∗(t, x, µ) := U(t, x, 2µ− 1).
Moreover, let
vN,i(t,x) = V N (t, xi, µ
N,i
x ), u
N,i(t,x) = U∗(t, xi, µ
N,i
x )
for i = 0, . . . , N , where µN,ix =
1
N
∑N
j=0,j 6=i δ{xi=1} is the fraction of the other players
in 1. Let also SεN := SN \ (12 − ε, 12 + ε). The following results are the adaptations of
Propositions 3 and 4 of [11]. The first provides a bound for ∆juN,i(t,x), while the second
shows that U∗ restricted to SεN is "almost" a solution of (25).
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Proposition 9. For any t ∈ [0, T ], ε > 0 and any x such that µN,ix ∈ SεN , if N ≥ 2ε , we
have
(33) ∆juN,i(t,x) = − 1
N
∂
∂µ
U(t, xi, µ
N,i
x ) + τ
N,i,j(t,x),
for any j 6= i, with
∣∣∣τN,i,j(t,x)∣∣∣ ≤ Cε
N2
. The constant Cε is proportional to the Lipschitz
constant of the master equation outside the discontinuity, which behaves like ε−
2
3 .
Proposition 10. For any t ∈ [0, T ], any ε > 0 and any µ such that either µ ∈ [12 + ε, 1]
or µ ∈ [0, 12 − ε], the function U∗(t, µ) satisfies
− d
dt
U∗(t, µ) +H(U∗(t,1− µ)− U∗(t,µ))
(34)
= Nµ [U∗(t,1− µ)− U∗(t,µ)]−
[
U∗
(
t,µ− 1
N
)
− U∗(t,µ)
]
+ rN (t, µ)
+N(1− µ)
[
U∗
(
t,µ+
1
N
)
− U∗
(
t,1− µ− 1
N
)]− [
U∗
(
t,µ+
1
N
)
− U∗(t,µ)
]
,
with
∣∣∣rN (t, µ)∣∣∣ ≤ CǫN , where Cε is as above.
We now use the information provided by Theorem 7. Set
ΣεN :=
{
x ∈ ΣN+1 :
N∑
i=0
δxi=1 6∈
(
N
2
−Nε, N
2
+Nε+ 1
)}
.
If x ∈ ΣεN , then µN,ix ∈ SεN for all i. Denote by Ys the state at time s of the N + 1
players corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. By Theorem 7 it follows that, if Yt ∈ ΣεN
for some t < T , then Ys ∈ ΣεN for all s ∈ [t, T ]. In particular, by using the invariance
property (24), we obtain
(35) vN,i(s,Ys) ≤ max
µN∈Sε
N
V N (s, µN ),
(36) |vN,i(s,Ys)− uN,i(s,Ys)| ≤ max
µN∈Sε
N
|V N (s, µN )− U∗(s, µN )|,
for every s ∈ [t, T ], almost surely, and
(37) max
x∈Σε
N
|vN,i(s,x)− uN,i(s,x)| = max
µN∈Sε
N
|V N (s, µN )− U∗(s, µN )|.
Moreover, we note that
|∆ivN,i(s,Ys)−∆ivN,i(s,Ys)|
= |V N (s,−Yi(s), µN,iY (s))− U(s,−Yi(s), µN,iY (s))
− V N (s, Yi(s), µN,iY (s)) + U(s, Yi(s), µN,iY (s))|
≤ 2 max
µN∈Sε
N
|V N (s, µN )− U(s, µN )|.(38)
Proof of Theorem 8. We choose a deterministic initial condition Yt ∈ ΣεN , at time t ∈
[0, T ). As in the proof of Theorem 3 in [11], we exploit the characterization, introduced
in [10], of the N -player dynamics in terms of SDEs driven by Poisson random measures,
and we apply Ito’s formula to the squared difference between the functions uN,it and v
N,i
t ,
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both computed in the optimal trajectories (Ys)s∈[t,T ]
1 . Using equations (34) and (25),
we then find
E[(uN,it − vN,it )2] +
N∑
j=0
E
[ ∫ T
t
αj(s,Ys)
(
∆j[uN,is − vN,is ]
)2
ds
]
(39)
= −2E
[ ∫ T
t
(uN,is − vN,is )
{
− rN(s, µN,iY (s)) +H(∆iuN,is )−H(∆ivN,is )
+
N∑
j=0,j 6=i
(αj − αj)∆juN,i + αi(∆iuN,is −∆ivN,is )
}
ds
]
,
where αi is the Nash equilibrium played by player i, αi is the control induced by U and
all the functions are evaluated on the optimal trajectories, e.g. vN,is := v
N,i(s,Ys). We
raise all the positive sum on the lhs and estimate the rhs using the Lipschitz properties
of H, the bounds on rN and ∆jui given by Proposition 9, and the bound on αj given by
the fact that ZN (t, µ) ≤ 2, to get, for N ≥ 2
ε
,
E[(uN,it − vN,it )2]
≤ C
N
E
[ ∫ T
t
|uN,is − vN,is |ds
]
+ CE
[ ∫ T
t
|uN,is − vN,is ||∆iuN,is −∆ivN,is |ds
]
+
C
N
N∑
j=0,j 6=i
E
[ ∫ T
t
|uN,is − vN,is ||∆juN,js −∆jvN,js |ds
]
,
which can be further estimated via the convexity inequality ab ≤ 12a2 + 12b2 yielding
E[(uN,it − vN,it )2] ≤
C
N2
+ CE
[∫ T
t
∣∣∣uN,is − vN,is ∣∣∣2ds
]
+ CE
[ ∫ T
t
∣∣∣∆iuN,is −∆ivN,is ∣∣∣2ds
]
+
C
N
N∑
j=0
E
[ ∫ T
t
|∆juN,js −∆jvN,js |2ds
]
.
Here C denotes any constant which may depend on ε, and is allowed to change from line
to line. Since all the functions are evaluated on the optimal trajectories, we apply (36)
and (38) to obtain
|uN,i(t,Yt)− vN,i(t,Yt)|2 ≤ C
N2
+ C
∫ T
t
max
µ∈Sε
N
|U(s, µ)− V N (s, µ)|2ds
for any deterministic initial condition Yt ∈ ΣεN . Therefore (37) gives
(40) max
µ∈Sε
N
|U(t, µ)− V N (t, µ)|2 ≤ C
N2
+ C
∫ T
t
max
µ∈Sε
N
|U(s, µ)− V N (s, µ)|2ds
and thus Gronwall’s lemma applied to the quantity maxµ∈Sε
N
|U(s, µ)− V N (s, µ)|2 allows
to conclude that
(41) max
µ∈Sε
N
|U(t, µ)− V N (t, µ)|2 ≤ C
N2
,
which immediately implies (32), but only if N ≥ 2
ε
. Changing the value of C = Cε, the
thesis follows for any N . 
1We remark that in [11], indeed, the controls (transition rates) are assumed to be bounded below away
from zero. Nevertheless, this fact is not used to derive the analogous identity to (39). A proof of the
convergence results with no lower bound on the controls can be found in Section 3.1 of [9], if the master
equation possesses a classical solution.
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3.5. Propagation of chaos. The next result gives the propagation of chaos property for
the optimal trajectories. Consider the initial datum (int = 0) ξ i.i.d with P (ξi = 1) = µ0
and E[ξi] = m0 = 2µ0 − 1, and denote by Yt = (Y0(t),Y1(t), . . . , YN (t)) the optimal
trajectories of the N+1-player game, i.e. when agents play the Nash equilibrium given
by (26). Also, denote by X˜t the i.i.d process in which players choose the local control
α˜(t,±1) := [Z(t,m∗(t))]∓, where Z is the entropy solution to (16) and m∗ is the unique
mean field game solution induced by Z, if m0 6= 0 (µ0 6= 12), that is the one which does
not change sign (see Proposition 6). The propagation of chaos consists in proving the
convergence of Yt to the i.i.d process X˜t.
Theorem 11 (Propagation of chaos). If µ0 6= 12 then, for any N and i = 0, . . . , N ,
(42) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yi(t)− X˜i(t)|
]
≤ Cµ0√
N
,
where Cµ0 does not depend on N , and limµ0→ 12
Cµ0 =∞.
Denote by Xi(t) the dynamics of the i-th player when choosing the control
(43) α¯i(t,x) = [∆iU(t, xi, µ
N,i
x )]
−
induced by the master equation. We use Xt as an intermediate process for obtaining the
propagation of chaos result. In fact, Xt can be treated as a mean field interacting system
of particles (since the rate in (43) depends on N only through the empirical measure), for
which propagation of chaos results are more standard. Next result shows the proximity
of the optimal dynamics to the intermediate process just introduced.
Theorem 12. If µ0 6= 12 then, for any N and i = 0, . . . , N ,
(44) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yi(t)−Xi(t)|
]
≤ Cµ0
N
,
where Cµ0 does not depend on N , and limµ0→ 12
Cµ0 = +∞.
Proof. Let µ0 =
1
2 +2ε and consider the event A where both Xt and Yt belong to Σ
ε
N , for
any time. Exploting the probabilistic representation of the dynamics in terms of Poisson
random measures (see [10]), we have
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|
]
≤ CE
[∫ t
0
[∣∣∣a∗(Xi,s,∆iuN,i(s,Xs))−a∗(Yi,s,∆ivN,i(s,Ys))∣∣∣+ |Xi,s−Yi,s|] ds]
≤ CE
[∫ t
0
[
|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|+ |∆iuN,i(s,Xs)−∆ivN,i(s,Ys)|
]
ds
]
≤ CE
[∫ t
0
|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|ds
]
+ CE
[
1A
∫ t
0
|∆iuN,i(s,Ys)−∆ivN,i(s,Ys)|ds
]
+ CE
[
1A
∫ t
0
|∆iuN,i(s,Xs)−∆iuN,i(s,Ys)|ds
]
+ CP (Ac).
and now we apply (32) together with (38), the Lipschitz continuity of U in ΣεN and the
exchangeability of the processes to get, if N ≥ 2
ε
,
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|
]
≤ C
N
+ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|ds + P (Ac)
+ CE
[
1A
∫ t
0
[
|U(s,Xi(s), µN,iX (s))− U(s,Xi(s), µN,iY (s))|
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+|U(s,−Xi(s), µN,iX (s))− U(s,−Xi(s), µN,iY (s))|
]
ds
]
≤ C
N
+ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|ds + P (Ac) +CE

1A
∫ t
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
|Xj(s)− Yj(s)|ds

≤ C
N
+ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− Yi(s)|ds + P (Ac).(45)
We can bound the probability of Ac by considering the process in which the transition
rates are equal to 0, for any time, i.e. the constant process equal to the initial condition ξ.
Thanks to the shape of the Nash equilibrium, which prevents the dynamics from crossing
the discontinuity, and of the control induced by the solution to the Master equation, we
have
(46) P (Ac) = P (∃t : either Xt or Yt /∈ ΣεN ) ≤ 2P (ξ /∈ ΣεN ).
For the latter, we have
P (ξ /∈ ΣεN ) = P
(
N∑
i=0
ξi ∈
(
N
2
−Nε, N
2
+Nε+ 1
))
≤ P
(
N∑
i=0
ξi ≤ N
2
+Nε+ 1
)
≤ P
(
µNξ ≤
1
2
+ εN
)
,
denoting εN :=
N
2
+Nε+1
N+1 − 12 . Observing that (N + 1)µNξ ∼ Bin(N + 1, 12 + 2ε) (recall
µ0 =
1
2 + 2ε), we can further estimate, by standard Markov inequality,
P (ξ /∈ ΣεN ) ≤ P
(∣∣∣∣µNξ − 12 − 2ε
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 2ε− εN) ≤ Var
[
µNξ
]
(2ε − εN )2
=
1
N + 1
(
1
2 + 2ε
) (
1
2 − 2ε
)
(
2ε− N
N+1
(
1
2 + ε
)
− 1
N+1 +
1
2
)2 ≤ CNε(47)
if N ≥ 2
ε
, so that 2ε− εN ≥ ε4 .
Putting estimate (47) into (45), and denoting ϕ(t) := E
[
sups∈[0,t] |Xi(s)− Yi(s)|
]
, we
obtain
(48) ϕ(t) ≤ C
Nε
+ C
∫ t
0
ϕ(s)ds
which, by Gronwall’s lemma, gives (44), but only if N ≥ 2
ε
. By changing the value of
C = Cε, the claim follows for any N . 
We are now in the position to prove Theorem 11. Thanks to (44), it is enough to show
that
(49) E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xi(t)− X˜i(t)|
]
≤ Cµ0√
N
,
Recall that the X˜i’s are i.i.d and Law(X˜i(t)) = m
∗(t); also, set m = m∗ and µ = m+12 .
Moreover, we know that (N+1)µN
X˜
(t) ∼ Bin(N+1, µ(t)). The rate of convergence follows
from the estimate
(50) E
∣∣∣µN
X˜
(t)− µ(t)
∣∣∣ ≤ C√
N
,
for any time, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
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Proof of Theorem 11. Let µ0 =
1
2 + 2ε and consider the event A where both Xt and X˜t
belong to ΣεN , for any time. Arguing as in the proof of Theorem 12, we obtain
E
[
sup
s∈[0,t]
|Xi(s)− X˜i(s)|
]
≤ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− X˜i(s)|ds + P (Ac)
+ CE
[
1A
∫ t
0
|U(s,Xi(s), µN,iX (s))− U(s,Xi(s), µN,iX˜ (s))|
+ |U(s,−Xi(s), µN,i
X˜
(s))− U(s,−Xi(s), µ(s))|ds
]
≤ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− X˜i(s)|ds + P (Ac)
+CE

1A
∫ t
0
1
N
∑
j 6=i
|Xj(s)− X˜j(s)|ds
+ C sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
∣∣∣µN
X˜
(t)− µ(t)
∣∣∣
≤ C√
N
+ C
∫ t
0
E|Xi(s)− X˜i(s)|ds+ P (Ac).
We can bound the probability of Ac as before and thus Gronwall’s Lemma allows to
conclude. 
3.6. Potential mean field game. We give here another characterization of the solutions
to the MFG system (10). For a more detailed introduction on potential mean field games
in the finite state space see [9], Section 1.4.1. We show that system (10) can be viewed as
the necessary conditions for optimality, given by the Pontryagin maximum principle, of
a deterministic optimal control problem in R2. We show that the N -player game, in the
limit as N → +∞, selects exactly the global minimizer of this problem when it is unique,
i.e. when m0 6= 0.
The notation is slightly different in this section. Consider the controlled dynamics,
representing the KFP equation,
(51)

m˙1 = m−1α−1 −m1α1
m˙−1 = m1α1 −m−1α−1
m(0) = m0.
The state variable is m(t) = (m1(t),m−1(t)). Note that, in the previous notation, we had
m1 = µ and m = m1−m−1. Here the control is α(t) = (α1(t), α−1(t)), deterministic and
open-loop, taking values in
A = {(a1, a−1) : a1, a−1 ≥ 0} .
Clearly, if m0 = (m0,1,m0,−1) belongs to the simplex
P ({1,−1}) := {(m1,m−1) : m1 +m−1 = 1,m1,m−1 ≥ 0} ,
then, for any choice of the control α, the dynamics remains in P ({1,−1}) for any time.
The cost to be minimized is
(52) J (α) =
∫ T
0
(
m1(t)
α1(t)
2
2
+m−1(t)
α−1(t)
2
2
)
dt+ G(m(T )),
where G(m1,m−1) := − (m1−m−1)
2
2 is such that
∂
∂m1
G(m) = −(m1 −m−1) =: G(1,m)
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∂
∂m−1
G(m) = m1 −m−1 =: G(−1,m),
whereas G(x,m) = −x(m1 − m−1), for x = ±1, is the terminal cost. This structure is
called potential Mean Field Game, since we have ∇G(m) = G(·,m).
The Hamiltonian of this problem is
H(m,u) = sup
a∈A
{
−b(m,a) · u−m1a
2
1
2
−m−1
a2−1
2
}
= m1
[(u−1 − u1)−]2
2
+m−1
[(u1 − u−1)−]2
2
,
where bx(m,a) = m−xa−x−mxax, for x = ±1, is the vector field in (51), and the argmax
of the Hamiltonian is
a∗1(u) = (u−1 − u1)−,
a∗−1(u) = (u1 − u−1)−.
Thus, the HJB equation of the control problem reads
(53)
{
−∂U
∂t
+H(m,∇mU) = 0 t ∈ [0, T ),m ∈ P({1,−1})
U(T,m) = G(m),
and its characteristics curves are given by the MFG system
(54)

−u˙1 + [(u−1−u1)
−]2
2 = 0
−u˙−1 + [(u1−u−1)
−]2
2 = 0
m˙1 = m−1a
∗
−1(u)−m1a∗1(u)
m˙−1 = m1a
∗
1(u)−m−1a∗−1(u)
u±1(T ) = G(±1,m(T )), m(0) = m0.
Lemma 13. (1) There exists an optimum of the control problem (51)-(52);
(2) The MFG system (54) represents the necessary conditions for optimality, given by
the Pontryagin maximum principle.
Proof. The first claim follows from Theorem 5.2.1 p. 94 in [4], which can be applied
since the dynamics is linear in α and the running cost is convex in α. Conclusion (2) is
standard. 
We know that, if T is large enough, there are three solutions to the MFG system. The
control problem (51)-(52) has a minimum, so we wonder which of these solutions is indeed
a minimizer.
First, we need to investigate some property of the roots of (14). Let T > T (m0) be
fixed. Let M1(m0) < M2(m0) < M3(m0) be the three solutions to (14). If m0 = 0 denote
M− =M1(0) < 0, M+ =M3(0) > 0; we have M2(0) = 0 and M+ =M−. If m0 > 0 then,
by Proposition 2, M3(m0) > 0 and M1(m0),M2(m0) < 0; if m0 < 0 then M3(m0) < 0
and M1(m0),M2(m0) > 0.
Lemma 14. Let m0 > 0 and T > T (m0) be fixed. Then
(1) The function [0,m0] ∋ m 7→ M3(m) ∈ [0, 1] is increasing, M2(m) is decreasing
and M1(m) is increasing. In particular for any m ∈ [0,m0]
(55) M3(m) > M+ = |M−| > |M1(m)| > |M2(m)| > M2(0) = 0
(2) We have M1(m) < −2T−13T < M2(m) < 0 and for any m ∈ [0,m0]
(56)
∣∣∣∣M2(m) + 2T − 13T
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣M1(m) + 2T − 13T
∣∣∣∣ .
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The case m0 < 0 is symmetric.
Proof. Claim (1) derives from the proof of Proposition 2. For claim (2), M1(m) and
M2(m) are the two negative roots of f(M) = T
2M3−T (2−T )M2+(1− 2T )M −m = 0.
The roots of f ′(M) are q := −2T−13T and 1T . Hence M1 < q < M2 < 0, f(q) > 0 and we
have, by Taylor’s formula (which here is actually a change of variable),
f(q + ε) = f(q) + f ′(q)ε+
f ′′(q)
2
ε2 +
f ′′′(q)
6
ε3 = f(q) +
f ′′(q)
2
ε2 + T 2ε3
f(q − ε) = f(q)− f ′(q)ε+ f
′′(q)
2
ε2 − f
′′′(q)
6
ε3 = f(q) +
f ′′(q)
2
ε2 − T 2ε3
for any ε > 0. Thus f(q+ε)−f(q−ε) = 2T 2ε3 > 0 for any ε > 0, which implies (56). 
For i = 1, 2, 3, denote bymi, zi, αi,mi, ui the solution to the MFG system corresponding
to Mi.
Theorem 15. Let m0 > 0 and T > T (m0) be fixed. Then for any m ∈ [0,m0] and
i = 1, 2, 3 we have J (αi) = ϕ(Mi(m)), where ϕ : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1],
(57) ϕ(M) :=M2
(
T − 1
2
− T |M |
)
.
Moreover, for any m ∈ (0,m0],
ϕ(M+) = ϕ(M−) < ϕ(0) = 0,(58)
ϕ(M3(m)) < ϕ(M+) < ϕ(M1(m)),(59)
ϕ(M1(m)) < ϕ(M2(m)) > 0,(60)
meaning that α+ and α− are both optimal if m = 0 and α ≡ 0 is not, while α3 is the
unique minimizer if m > 0, with
(61) J (α3) < J (α1) < J (α2).
Proof. The first claim and (57) follow directly from (52) and (13).
We continue by proving (59). The roots of ϕ′ are 0 and ±q, with q := −2T−13T . The
function ϕ is then increasing if either M < q or 0 < M < −q. Thus (59) follows from
(55) and the fact that ϕ(M+) = ϕ(M−), as ϕ(M) only depends on |M |.
Next, we show that ϕ(M+) < 0 = ϕ(0). SinceM+ solves T
2M2+T (2−T )M+1−2T =
0, we obtain, for M =M+,
ϕ(M) =
M2
2
(2T − 1− 2TM) = M
2
2
(T 2M2 − T 2M) = T
2M3
2
(M − 1) < 0
because M+ < 1.
To prove (60), we first note that we have just showed that it holds inm = 0: ϕ(M1(0)) =
ϕ(M−) = ϕ(M+) < 0 = ϕ(0) = ϕ(M2(0)). We also know that ϕ(M1(m)) > ϕ(M1(0))
and ϕ(M2(m)) > ϕ(M2(0)), thanks to the monotonicity behavior of ϕ and Lemma 14.
Hence suppose by contradiction that there exists m ∈]0,m0] such that ϕ(M1(m)) =
ϕ(M2(m)) = c, for some c > 0. This implies that both M1(m) and M2(m) are negative
roots of ϕ(M) − c. Thus they are also negative roots of
ψ(M) := Tϕ(M) − Tc− f(M) = 3
2
TM2 − (1− 2T )M +m− Tc = 0
and ψ′(q) = 0, where q = −2T−13T as above. Since ψ has degree 2, it follows that |M2(m)−
q| = |M1(m)−q|, but this contradicts (56). Therefore there is nom for which ϕ(M1(m)) =
ϕ(M2(m)), and then if (60) holds for m = 0 (which is (58)) then it is true for any
m ∈ [0,m0]. 
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Note that the results in this section imply that the N -player game selects, in the
limit as N → +∞, the global minimizer of the control problem (52), when it is unique.
Moreover, the sequence of the N -player value functions V N converges to the derivative of
the value function of such control problem, as the latter is constructed by using the same
characteristic curves used for constructing the solution (22) to the master equation. We
remark that the value function of the control problem (52) can also be characterized as
the unique viscosity solution to (53).
4. Conclusions
Let us summarize the main results we have obtained for this two state model with
anti-monotonous terminal cost:
(1) the mean field game possesses exactly 3 solutions, if T > 2 (Proposition 2);
(2) the N -player value functions converge to the entropy solution to the master equa-
tion (Theorem 8);
(3) the N -player optimal trajectories converge to one mean field game solution, if
m0 6= 0 (Theorem 11);
(4) viewing the mean field game system as the necessary conditions for optimality of
a deterministic control problem, the N -player game selects the global minimizer
of this problem, when it is unique, i.e. m0 6= 0 (Theorem 15).
We remark that in the convergence proof we did not make use of the characterization
of the right solution to the master equation as the entropy admissible one; the key point
is to show that the N -player optimal trajectories do not cross the discontinuity. Neither
did we use the potential structure of the problem: these are properties which might allow
to extend the convergence results to more general models.
Observe that solutions of the MFG system, whether selected by the limit of N -player
Nash equilibria or not, always yield approximate Nash equilibria in decentralized sym-
metric feedback strategies; see, for instance, [2] and [10] in the finite state setting.
What is left to prove for this model is a propagation of chaos result when m0 =
0. Let m+, resp. m−, be the mean field game solution always positive, resp. always
negative. What is evident from the simulations is that the N -player optimal trajectories
admit a limit which is not deterministic: it is supported in m+ and m− with probability
1/2. We also observe that m+ and m− are both minimizers of the deterministic optimal
control problem related to the potential structure. An analogous result is rigorously
obtained in [16] in the diffusion setting, where the focus is on starting the dynamics at
the discontinuity of the unique entropy solution to the master equation.
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